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Trends in Dutch prisoners rates: regression to the European mean or enduring exception? 
 
Jan Van Dijk, Tilburg University 
 
Introductory remarks 
With the abolition of capital punishment in most developed nations, the number of people in 
prison per 100.000 has become the key indicator of the punitiveness of national criminal justice 
systems. In the early 1970-s the Netherlands held a world record of leniency in criminal 
sentencing with 23 prisoners per 100.000. This was by far  the lowest prisoners rate of developed 
nations at the time. Although the Dutch prisoners rates thereafter went up, they stayed well below 
the European mean up to the mid 1990-s. This remarkable fact inspired  Dutch as well as some 
foreign criminologists to ruminate about a supposedly unique, Dutch culture  of tolerance 
regarding criminal behaviour (Hulsman et al, 1978; Downes, 1988). In 1986 I myself related the 
then still relatively low prisoners rates of The Netherlands to the pillarized nature of Dutch society 
(in Dutch known as de verzuiling) (Van Dijk, 1990)1. Before I comment on later developments and 
on the present situation, I will briefly summarize my argument about the Dutch prisoners rates of 
25 years ago.  
The concept of the pillarized society refers to the organization of Dutch society along lines of 
religious denomination rather than social classes. From the 17th century onwards Protestant  and  
Catholic communities kept each other politically more or less in the balance and were fiercely in 
competition with each other. Each of the churches developed its own networks of institutions 
delivering different forms of charity to its local communities (help for orphans, disabled people or 
the sick). The “pillars” were further developed in the second half of the 19th century. In the 20th 
century the church-based institutional networks further expanded  and were joined by a new “red 
pillar”, centring around the  Labour party. Each of the pillars ran its own political parties, labour 
unions,  council estates, newspapers, broadcasting companies, schools, hospitals, houses for the 
elderly and sports clubs as well as organizations for probation/aftercare  and child welfare. Many 
of these institutions were funded or co-funded by the government but remained legally 
independent from the state.  They were organizationally linked to either the Protestant or Catholic 
churches or to the Labour Party/Labour unions. 
The concept of the pillarized society explains the strength of intermediary structures in Dutch 
society in the 20th century. It has also been used to explain the Dutch tradition of political 
accommodation in national politics (Bagley, 1975; Lijphart, 1975).  Although many citizens lived 
from cradle to grave in the splendid isolation of their own column, at the highest political level in 
the capital a spirit of mutual tolerance prevailed. Political parties affiliated with the main pillars 
routinely entered into coalition governments with changing compositions.  
 
My article explored whether the concept of the pillarized society could also  shed light on the 
comparatively benign state of criminal justice in the Netherlands  around 1970-1990. I pointed at 
three factors that might have contributed to the production of  relatively low prisoners rates. First, 
the pillarized society maintained through its many intermediary structures a level of informal 
social control over young people that was relatively high from an international perspective.  For 
example, around 1970 the churches still played a major role in organized sports activities. This 
massive involvement in youth work may have had a preventive impact on juvenile delinquency 
rates. Second, vulnerable families and wayward young were supported by social institutions run 
by the pillars. Important examples were the powerful, church-based organizations for childcare 
and for rehabilitation of ex -prisoners.  Through these latter organizations, protestants ministers 
and priests played an important role in the design and implementation of penitentiary 
programmes. Till the early 1980-s the involvement of the churches in the execution of penal 
policies was expressed in the practice that name tags on prison cells indicated the religious 
denomination of the inmate. The church-based probation organizations made extensive use of 
volunteers.  Each of the pillars was ready to invest considerable human and financial resources in 
                                                  
1  The article published in 1989 was based on a lecture given to the participants of a conference on the 
occasion of the centurial celebration of the Dutch Penal Code of 1886 in Amsterdam (Van  Dijk et al, 
1986). 
the reintegration of prisoners from their own communities. The pillarized nature of prisoners re-
entry might have helped to reduce recidivism. 
Thirdly, the tradition of accommodation  at the political level just mentioned, demanded that each 
pillar invested considerable discretionary power in its social elites. The political culture and 
institutional arrangements in The Netherlands could be characterized as a  mediated or indirect 
form of democracy.  A telling feature of Dutch democracy is that Mayors of big cities are not 
elected but appointed by the central government. Candidates are chosen by the minister of 
Interior from a  pool of national politicians. In the larger cities the candidates invariably belong to 
one of the main pillars/political parties. Up till quite recently political careers were almost 
exclusively made within the established channels of the main political parties. There was little 
room for individual politicians to directly  appeal to the voters. 
Another feature of the pillarized political culture is the retention of a court system which is 
exclusively run by professional lawyers appointed for life. Also prosecutors are career civil 
servants, trained and remunerated similarly as judges.  By tradition senior judges and 
prosecutors were, just like Mayors, recruited from the upper segments of the pillars. The  Dutch 
justice system  operates without any involvement of lay judges or juries.  
Within the confines of their own pillars, politicians and judges tended to hold moderate views of 
crime and offenders and to have an open mind for new ideas about social case work, preventive 
mental health  and treatment of offenders coming from the USA. An example of typically Dutch 
policies in this domain is  the introduction of special treatment arrangements for mentally 
disturbed offenders.  Such offenders are offered long term treatment by psychiatrists in private 
clinics, run by the pillars.  Also, the execution of penal sanctions for minors was partly put in the 
hands of church-based institutions. Relatively liberal policies regarding abortion  and euthanasia, 
introduced in the final decades of the last century, can also be seen as fruits of “the politics of 
accommodation”.  In both cases new standards were incrementally introduced by the judicial 
system and by and large tolerated by the political establishment operating in coalition 
governments. Another interesting case history is the adoption of liberal drugs policies. In the 
1970ties  experts recommended a differential policy for soft and hard drugs and a humane, health 
oriented policies regarding drug addicts.  These recommendations originally emanated from a 
working group of experts, set up by a federation of church-based voluntary organizations in 1970 
( called after its chairman, professor of criminology Loek Hulsman). The commission’s  
recommendations on the need to differentiate policies for soft and hard drugs and for a medical 
approach to drugs addiction were soon  adopted by the government2.   
 
In sum, the pillarized society seems to have contributed to the retention of relatively low prisoners 
rates in several ways. First it helped to control crime and delinquency through the interventions of 
powerful intermediary structures exercising informal or semi-formal social control over young 
people. The pillarized intermediary structures provided the type of interventions that are currently 
known as primary, secondary and tertiary crime prevention. Second, the somewhat elitist nature 
of Dutch political culture allowed the political-judicial   establishment to experiment with 
penitentiary innovations and maintain relatively mild sentencing tariffs. Both factors have mutually 
reinforced each other. Together they can help to explain  the exceptionally low prisoners rate of 
The Netherlands around 1980. 
 
At a higher level of abstraction, the punitiveness of nations has been found to be strongly related 
to levels of socio-economic inequality ( Wilkinson, 2005; Van Kesteren, 2009) and to the strength 
of the welfare state (Leppa-Seppala, 2008).  More equalitarian societies tend to produce lower 
rates of prisoners. The Dutch case of the pillarized society can be understood as a specification 
of the general finding that economic and social equality foster relatively non-punitive criminal 
policies.  
 
In a concluding paragraph, I observed that, at the time of writing (1986) the  pillarized society was 
being eroded by  the affuence –driven joint processes of individualism and secularization. In a 
brief period of time, the pillars seemed to be losing control over their communities.  In many fields 
                                                  
2 Although for many years , these liberal drugs policies have been a bone of contention in the international 
political arena, they  seems to have achieved its main objective of containing  the spread of drug addiction and 
related health problems reasonably well  (WODC/Trimbos, 2010). 
of life Protestant, Catholic and Socialist organizations entered into mergers, shredding their past 
affiliations. These so called processes of “depillarization” (in Dutch: ontzuiling)  constituted in my 
view a challenge for the “Dutch exception” in matters of crime and criminal justice. Since the 
pilIarized society seemed to be of diminishing importance, I expressed doubt about the 
sustainability of the country’s low prisoners rates. I observed that in 1985  the Dutch government 
had decided to respond to rising numbers of people sentenced to imprisonment with the 
expansion of prison capacity. This expansion could be seen as an ominous  sign that the era of 
Dutch tolerance  was nearing to its end. Critics of the expansion had indeed warned against a 
first move on a slippery slope towards a harsher, Americanized criminal policy. On a more 
optimistic note, I pointed out that the Dutch government had in its white paper Society and Crime 
(1985) proposed a comprehensive, balanced  strategy against volume crime, explicitly rejecting a 
“war on crime”. It did not only announce the building of  new prisons but simultaneously launched, 
with unanimous support from the main political parties,  an ambitious, relatively well-funded  
programme for crime prevention and victim assistance. This programme could in my view be 
seen as a last-ditched  effort to maintain formerly  church-based institutions of informal social 
control in the new framework of the extended welfare state. The title of my article was: Dutch 
Criminal Policies at the Cross- Roads3. The article ended with a cautiously optimistic note on the 
prospects of preserving the Dutch tradition of moderation in criminal matters.  
 
 
Revisiting the statistics 
With hindsight, it appears that the modest expansion of prison capacity in 1985 has, as predicted 
by the governments’ critics at the time, proven to be the beginning of a  prolonged prison building 
spree. Over the past twenty years the prison capacity in The Netherlands has been more than 
tripled in size.  
The Council of Europe has for many years collected and published comparative statistics on the 
numbers of prisoners in  the Member States. These official statistics have generally been 
accepted by criminologists at face value, unlike the more heavily contested police-based statistics 
on levels of crime . Table 1 presents an overview of trends in prison rates for selected developed 
countries between 1980 and 2007 according to the Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics-
SPACE1. These statistics are also published in the European Sourcebook and in the reports on 
crime and justice  statistics of the Ministry of Justice’s Research and Documentation Centre and 
the Central Bureau of Statistics (Criminaliteit en Rechtshandhaving, 2008)4. Similar statistics are 
published by Eurostat (Tavares &Thomas, 2009) and by the United Nations (Walmsley, 2009).  
 
                                                  
3 “One component of the plan announces the construction of five new prisons each with 250 cells and 
more stringent prosecution of petty crimes. This component suggests a step towards a more 
repressive criminal policy. Yet the Dutch government also categorically rejects the concept that the 
crime problem can be dealt with effectively by means of a more repressive criminal policy alone. It has 
directed financial support to over 200 local crime prevention initiatives in 90 different cities. An 
historical perspective suggests that the current crime prevention campaign is an effort to recover the 
level of informal social control that previously was exercised by pillarization. Criminal policy in the 
Netherlands, the industrialized nation with the lowest imprisonment rate, appears to be at a 
crossroads.” (Van Dijk, 1989). 
 
 
Table1  Number of prisoners per 100.000 inhabitants  
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Australia . . . 96 112 115 114 118 120 124  .   . 
Canada . . . 131 118 116 112 115 . .  .   . 
Japan . 46 39 37 47 50 53 58 . 62 
  
63   . 





             
 
** Up to 1990 statistics for West Germany and Berlin only.     
Source: WODC, Home Office, 
Council of Europe          
 
The data presented in table 1 confirm the exceptionally steep  rise of the Dutch prison population. 
They also suggest that The Netherlands belonged in 2007 with a prisoners rate of 113 to the 
group of most punitive countries in Western Europe. Other sources confirmed that the Dutch 
rates lie above those of most Western European countries 5. 
The steepest rise in Dutch prisoners rates has occurred between 1995 and 2000. An explanatory 
note explains that this surge is partly caused by the switch to a new source of information: the 
improved prison statistics of the Council of Europe. From 1999 onwards persons convicted for 
criminal offences receiving treatment in special mental hospitals are included in the Dutch figures. 
The inclusion of this category of detainees seems warranted since these persons have been 
convicted by criminal judges for serious offences and  would in other countries have been 
detained in (special departments of) prisons. It is somewhat surprising that they had been 
excluded in previous overviews. With hindsight Dutch prison statistics seem in the past to have 
been somewhat deflated by the exclusion of mentally disturbed convicts hold in private clinics, 
traditionally run by the pillars. The Dutch prison rates around 1980 would probably have been 
less exceptional if the offenders kept in special clinics would have been included. 
 
The prisoners rates of The Netherlands reported by the Council of Europe have not only been 
readjusted. They also differ from those of Eurostat and the United Nations (Walmsley, 2009). 
These findings raise the question about which standards for inclusion have been used. The 
calculation of prisoners rates seems to be less obvious than has previously been assumed. 
Lappi-Seppala (2008) has raised  doubts on the comparability of prisoners rates on theoretical 
grounds (Lappi-Seppalla, 2008). In the latest edition of the Council of Europe Statistics, the 
national prison statistics have been subjected to a (long overdue) critical review  (Aebi & 
Delgrande, 2009). The report discusses the need of ascertaining whether or not national figures 
include subcategories such as minors held in institutions for juvenile offenders, mentally ill 
offenders held in special hospitals and illegal aliens held for administrative reasons. The report 
subsequently concludes that the existing national figures vary greatly in terms of the inclusion or 
exclusion of these subcategories and are therefore not strictly comparable. The authors have to 
the extent possible readjusted the prisoners rates of individual countries. As the authors observe 
in a footnote, the Dutch figures had to be adjusted more than those of other countries because of 
the inclusion of considerable numbers of illegal immigrants held in administrative detention 
pending decisions on their status. The Dutch figures are further inflated by the inclusion of minors 
                                                  
5  According to the COE the total number was 18.746 in 2007. Eurostat reports the number to be 
14.450 in 2007 ( Aebi, Delgrande  2009). According to the Walmsley ( 2009) it was 16.416 in 2008. 
According to all these estimates the Dutch rate lies significantly above the mean of Western European 
countries. 
placed in institutions for juveniles by civil courts by way of child protective measure.6 These two 
categories should not have been included according to the definitions of prisoners used by the 
COE. The publication duly notes that the Dutch prisoners rates as puiblished by the COE have 
been more inflated than those of any other country.  
The report presents a table with adjusted prisoners rates for adults for 2007. In this table the 
report presents national figures of adult prisoners excluding the subcategories just mentioned. 
These adjusted prison statistics reflect the hard core of adult persons  held in prisons for the 
commission of criminal acts. Because of the clarity of the standard for inclusion , they are more 
suited for comparative purposes than the unadjusted statistics. The results are presented in table 
2. 
 
Table 2  Number of adult offenders detained in prison per 100.000 (source: SPACE 1, Survey 
2007/ 24 March, 20090 
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European mean 119.4 
 
According to this table the Dutch prisoners rates per 100.000 for adults in 2007 was 72  (a total 
number of 11.972).  This rate lies 30% below the rate of 113 published by the COE. The adjusted 
Dutch rate also lies far below the European mean of  119. The Dutch rate is considerably lower 
than those of France (96), Germany (83) and Belgium (90). In fact, the rate is with those of 
Switzerland and Sweden the lowest of all  Western European countries. We suspect that the 
prisoners rates for The Netherlands published by Eurostat and the United Nations are similarly 
inflated by the erroneous inclusion of illegal immigrants and juveniles in institutions at the order of 
a civil judge. 
 
Conventional wisdom among criminologists holds that Dutch prison statistics have exploded from 
one of the lowest in Western Europe to one of the highest. This notion now  appears to have 
been  based on seriously flawed statistics. The older Dutch figures  were deflated by the 
exclusion of mentally disturbed offenders in hospitals and the newer ones were inflated by the 
inclusion of illegal aliens in administrative detention and juveniles  in institutions at the order of 
                                                  
6  The inclusion of illegal aliens is explained by the fact that special institutions for illegal aliens/asylum 
seekers are under the management of the same justice-related agency that is responsible for prisons ( 
Dienst Justitiele Inrichtingen).  
civil courts. If these errors are corrected, trends in prisoners rates in The Netherlands appear to 
have been less extreme compared to those of other countries than was previously assumed. 
The correct number of prisoners per 100.000 inhabitants should in our view be based on the 
numbers of adult prisoners plus the numbers of those convicted for crimes detained in special 
hospitals and of juvenile offenders convicted by juvenile justice courts for criminal acts. For The 
Netherlands this would result into absolute numbers of 15.777 in 2007 and 14.734 in 2008 (a rate 
per 100,000 of 88.1)7. Comparable statistics from other European countries are not available but 
the corrected Dutch rates stay without any doubt below the Western European mean.  
 
This empirical critique of the prisoners statistics of COE, Eurostat and UN sheds a new light on 
the issue of Dutch prisoners rates.  These rates have been less exceptional than assumed.  But 
in some respects the Dutch situation still stands out as rather special. They have since 1980  
gone up more steeply than elsewhere in Europe. The (uncorrected)  COE/Eurostat figures 
presented in table 1  point at another peculiarity in   the Dutch prisoners rates. After its zenith of 
134 in 2005, the Dutch prisoners rates have suddenly dropped steeply, by over 20%, thereafter. 
In no other developed country, besides Portugal, similarly significant drops have occurred. In 
2008 the unadjusted rate had dropped further to 106 per 100,000. Preliminary data on 2009 
suggest a continuation of the downward trend. The Dutch prisoners rates are plummeting while 
rates in other countries remain stable. Dutch rates seem set to become once one of  the lowest in 
the region. Policy-decisions by the Dutch government confirm the radical nature of the recent 
decline in prisoners. In response to the obvious downward trend, the Ministry of Justice has in 
2009 embarked on a major programme of downsizing its prison capacity. Several prisons will be 
closed down and some prison space has been rented out to Belgium. 
 
What factual conclusions can be drawn from these findings on prisoners rates regarding Dutch 
criminal policies? Thirty years ago the rate was considerably lower than the European mean. It 
has then moved up steeply and has perhaps temporarily surpassed the Western European mean. 
However, if the figures are made more comparable by the exclusion of various subcategories, the 
Dutch core rate of adult offenders in prison  seems still to be below the Western European mean. 
These results raise several important questions. The first question is how the volatility in the 
Dutch rates can be explained? Why did they go up faster than elsewhere and are they now falling 
faster than elsewhere. Was this curvi-linear trend caused by changes in the numbers and 
seriousness of cases put before the Dutch courts or was it caused by sudden step changes in the 
sentencing tariffs of the Dutch courts?  In other words was the movement in prisoners rates 
caused by changes in the level of detected crime or in sentencing tariffs of the courts? The 
exceptional magnitude of the changes in The Netherlands makes an in depth analysis of the 
Dutch case worthwhile since it might lead to “poenametric” insights of more general interest. 
 
The second question raised by the Dutch trends in prisoners rates is how movements in crime in 
the Netherlands  and/or in the sentencing tariffs of the Dutch courts can be sociologically 
explained. For this purpose, I  will revisit  my previous interpretation of the exceptionally low  
Dutch prisoners rate around 1970-1990. Can the volatility in the Dutch prisoners rate and their 
current comparatively modest level still be usefully interpreted within the context of the Dutch  
traditions of a pillarized society? Or has the government embarked on a new policy, balancing 
preventive and repressive approaches to crime?  
 
Trends in prisoners rates: crime driven 
or sentence- driven ? 
The rise in Dutch prisoners rates since 1985  has by several commentators been attributed to a  
toughening up of sentencing tariffs. As such it has been interpreted as a falling in line of Dutch 
sentencing policies with the new wave of punitiveness emanating from the USA (Junger –Tas, 
1995).  Pakes concluded that traditional Dutch reductionist penal policies had  been put into the 
reverse ( Pakes, 2005).  Van Swaaningen and Downes (2007) likewise deplore the “punitive turn” 
taken by the Dutch.  We have discussed above that these observations were partly based on 
                                                  
7  These numbers have also been submitted to the Council of Europe and the UN for inclusion in 
future publications and will also be submitted to Eurostat by the CBS  ( personal communication by 
Paul Smit of the Ministry of Justice  to the author).  
erroneous statistics.  We also  would like to question the assumption that increases in rates of 
prisoners always reflect a punitive turn. In a recent, in depth  analysis of Dutch prisoners trends 
Vollaard and Molenaar (2009) conclude that sentencing  tariffs for separate categories of crime 
have not  changed very much. Their  results show that the upward trend in prisoners rates 
between 1990 and 2003 is largely accounted for by  increases in the numbers of cases of serious 
crimes such as homicides and armed robberies. In other words, the increase in numbers of 
prisoners was largely driven by a boom in serious crime. This conclusion  confirms previous 
analyses by Grapendaal  et al  (1997) who have also concluded that sentencing tariffs had not 
significantly changed since 1990.  An exception was the increased severity of  sentences for 
violent, sexual crimes. The stiffer penalties for sexual violence seem to reflect changes in cultural 
norms regarding such behaviour, especially sexual violence between intimates, rather than a 
change in punitiveness across the board.  
The  now available evidence on Dutch sentencing shows that  the upward trends in prisoners 
rates are largely explained by a changes in the volume  and seriousness of  the cases tried. This 
might even be the case to a larger extent than  Vollaard and Molenaar themselves assume. They 
have looked at changes in sentencing tariffs for ten different categories of crimes. On this basis 
they conclude that the tariff for categories such as robbery has not become much more  severe. 
But even if the average sentences for such crimes would have gone up, this might not necessarily 
imply that a stiffer tariff has been adopted. An analysis differentiating between ten categories of 
crime  does  not  fully catch possible changes in the seriousness of the cases within these 
categories. For example  the use of firearms in cases of robbery might have become more 
common. 
There are compelling arguments to assume that over the past years average sentences have 
become somewhat stiffer because of changes in the composition of the cases tried. Since 
investigation departments, prosecutors and courts  possess limited resources,  the less serious 
cases tend to be filtered out. In a period of rising crime,  the mean seriousness of cases within 
categories is likely to  go up. The increased average  seriousness of the cases per category tried 
by the courts could very well explain possible increases in the length of the sentences imposed.  
Another factor that could lead to higher sentences without a change in punitiveness, is recidivism. 
The authors have not controlled  for the possibility that  a higher proportion of suspects in 2000 
might have been recidivist offenders than was the case twenty years ago. Since recidivism is one 
of the key determinants of sentencing severity, sentences might have gone up without changes in 
the judicial tariffs. In an era of increasing crime rates the proportion of recidivists is likely to be on 
the rise. The recidivist factor alone can act as a major driver of sentencing severity, even when 
sentencing tariffs remain unchanged.  
 
If the steep rise in Dutch prisoners rates cannot be attributed to changes in sentencing tariffs- and 
thus not to increased punitiveness of the courts-, what about the sudden drop in prisoners rates 
since 2006?  In the same article Vollaard and Molenaar (2009)  assert that, although a drop in 
serious violent crime might have been a contributory factor, the  major cause of the drop seems 
to have been  new legislation and prosecution guidelines promoting the substitution of short 
prison sentences by community service orders. In their view, the recent drop in prisoners rates is 
probably caused by milder sentencing tariffs for non-serious crime such as burglaries introduced 
in the framework of newly introduced  criminal policies. In the media this conclusion was 
presented as evidence that the Dutch judiciary had turned soft on crime. According to some 
commentators it had apparently lost its touch with public opinion.  
Analysts of the Ministry of Justice repeated the analysis, using datasets which allow 
differentiation between sentences for more subcategories of crime than those used by the 
authors. This analysis checks in a more detailed way to which extent changes in the numbers of 
imprisonment imposed  are caused by changes in numbers of cases and changes in average 
sentences respectively. Table 3 shows a synthesis of their results. The table presents  the 
numbers of prison sentences per category, average duration of prison sentences, number of 
years of imprisonment imposed  as well as changes in the latter for all crimes and for selected 
subcategories of crime. The column at the right shows the  proportion of the total decline in 
imposed years of imprisonment  attributable to the imposed sentences for the different 
subcategories.  
 











in  % of  
                  years change
  2003 2007  2003 2007  2003 2007     
                       
violent cirme          
Rape 229 161 
-
30% 521 502 -4% 327 221 -32% -106 2%
Homicide 1.130 667 
-
41% 679 746 10% 2.102 1.353 -36% -749 15%
Assault 1.698 1.861 10% 97 88 -10% 451 446 -1% -5 0%
Robbery 2.432 1.595 
-
34% 289 310 7% 1.923 1.356 -29% -567 11%
            
property crime          
Fraud 2.455 1.685 
-
31% 86 86 0% 580 398 -31% -182 4%
Theft 7.391 3.315 
-
55% 28 37 32% 561 333 -41% -228 5%
aggrav theft 7.680 4.004 
-
48% 90 95 6% 1.888 1.041 -45% -847 17%
Fencing 1.187 617 
-
48% 65 66 3% 210 112 -47% -98 2%
          
Narcotics          
Harddrugs 5.226 3.271 
-
37% 291 249 -14% 4.168 2.232 -46% -1.935 39%
Softdrugs 328 311 -5% 130 92 -29% 117 79 -33% -38 1%
              
Total 37.019 23.674 
-




These analyses show that the years of imprisonment imposed by the Dutch courts dropped from 
a total of 14.465 in 2003 to 9.514 in 2007 (-34%). The drop by 4.951 years is for 84% explained 
by decreases in the numbers of prison sentences for serious crimes such as homicides, robbery,  
aggravated theft/burglary and trafficking in hard drugs.  The data show a considerable drop in the 
numbers of cases of serious crime put before the courts. During these years the average length 
of prison sentences for these categories did not decrease. In fact the duration of the prison 
sentences went slightly up, with the exception of sentences for drugs cases.  
The decrease in imposed prison sentences for aggravated theft explains 17% of the total 
decrease in imposed years of imprisonment. This means that substitution of community service 
for short prison sentences has probably indeed played a role in the drop in prisoners but not a 
major one. The number of community services orders has gone up from 33.450 in 2003 to 40.000 
in 2007 but these sanctions can only be imposed to replace prison sentences of up to three 
months. They cannot  by themselves explain the fall in years of imprisonment imposed8. The 
                                                  
8 I thank Bert Berghuis and Jaap de Waard of the Ministry of Justice for sharing with me the results of 
these analyses. As part of the analysis a scenario study was conducted which applied the sentencing 
tariffs of 2003 to the numbers of cases per category of crime in 2007. This scenario resulted in a drop 
hypothesis that  the drop is mainly caused by a  downward adjustment of sentencing tariffs by the 
courts, especially by replacing prison sentences by community service orders in cases of 
burglary, is refuted.  
The drop in the number of cases of serious violent crime before the courts is likely to have been 
caused by declines in the numbers of such crimes committed. Results of victimization surveys  
point at a significant drop in most forms of volume crime in The Netherlands (Van Dijk, Van 
Kesteren & Smit, 2008). Homicide rates and rates of police-recorded robberies, burglaries and 
car thefts have also decreased significantly since the mid 1990-s (Tavares, Thomas, 2009; Smit, 
Nieuwbeerta, 2007). Numbers of cases of trafficking in  hard drugs have also decreased. This 
seems to be the result of the introduction of stricter checks on drugs possession in ports of entry 
in the Dutch Antilles from where cocaine used to be imported to The Netherlands. Consequently 
fewer arrest have been made for drugs trafficking upon arrival at Schiphol Airport. 
 
In sum the drop in Dutch prisoners rates is  largely  accounted for by reductions of the numbers of 
serious offences tried by the Dutch courts. The policies to replace short prison sentences  by 
community service orders have contributed only marginally to the drop in prisoners. 
As discussed, the prolonged rise of prisoners rates  between 1990 and 2003 was largely caused 
by a boom in serious crime. Similarly, the recent drop in prisoners rates seems mainly to have 
been caused by a drop in serious crime.  
 
These results shed a new light on the issue whether Dutch judges have become more or less 
punitive over the years. The curvi-linear trend in Dutch prisoners rates cannot be attributed to 
distinct changes in sentencing tariffs. Both the steep rise in years of imprisonment imposed by the 
courts  in the last two decades of the past century and the fall in recent years were largely 
determined by changes  in the number of cases of serious crime brought before them. These 
numbers have consistently gone up for several years. They  reached a ceiling around 2000. Over  
the same period sentencing tariffs seem not to have changed much. If  the available data on 
prisoners rates tell us anything about sentencing in The Netherlands, it is that sentencing  tariffs 
per category of crime have remained remarkably stable over the last three decades. Crime rates 
as well as concern about crime have boomed in The Netherlands between 1970 and 2000 and 
this has led to a media –led demand for more punitive criminal policies. It prompted the Dutch  
government to issue its first ever comprehensive policy plan against crime in 1985. In recent 
years levels of volume crime and serious crime have fallen. Investigators have more resources 
available to investigate serious crimes. Stricter responses to violent crime have become a political 
priority and  penitentiary capacity is available to detain more offenders. In spite of these changing 
external circumstances,  sentences meted out by the Dutch courts for individual criminal  cases 
have essentially remained the same. Radical changes in levels of crime, public opinion on crime 
and in available resources for crime control seem not to have had any discernible impact on the 
sentencing tariffs of the Dutch courts.  
There is evidence that levels of serious crime have been falling in most other Western countries 
as well, most notably in the USA (Blumstein, Waller, 2005; van Dijk, van Kesteren & Smit, 2008). 
But this downward trend in crime has not been reflected in subsequent significant falls in national 
prisoners rates. In this respect The Netherlands prisoners s rates show an exceptional trend. 
Dutch prisoner ‘s rates seem more tightly linked to movements in the level of serious crime than 
in, for example, the USA or the United Kingdom. In the latter countries similar drops in crime so 
far have not (yet) been translated into falling prisoners rates. Perhaps in other countries judges 
are more responsive to external administrative or political pressures. Surely, in The USA many 
judges are elected and therefore stand under more pressure from public opinion about 
sentencing than Dutch judges who are appointed for life. What has happened in other countries 
can only be determined by focussed empirical research. For the Netherlands it can safely be 
concluded that sentencing tariffs have proven to be fairly policy-resistant. For this reason any 
movement in the level of crime is with some delay reflected in prisoners rates.  
 
The analysis of Dutch sentencing patterns has yielded some insights of general interest. 
Prisoners rates by themselves do not allow conclusions on the severity of prevailing sentencing 
                                                                                                                                                            
in year of imprisonment imposed by the courts of 5.000. A scenario applying the tariffs of 2003 to the 
numbers in 2007 resulted in an insignificant change of 4 detention years. 
tariffs. Such conclusions can only be drawn from a refined analysis of sentencing decisions taking 
into account the seriousness of the cases brought before the courts. These analyses, then, must 
be conducted with due methodological care. The conclusion of  Junger-Tas (1998) that Dutch 
sentencing tariffs have become more punitive after 1990 and of Vollaard and Molenaar (2009)  
that they have become less punitive after 2000 were based on analyses of sentencing data that 
were insufficiently detailed. For a proper analysis of sentencing data, datasets are required which 
differentiate to a fairly high degree between the seriousness of the cases processed by the 
courts. Ideally, such studies should be based on the analysis of samples of individual criminal 
cases, controlling for different dimensions of seriousness determining sentencing severity and  for 
the criminal records of the offenders involved. 
 
The Dutch debates on sentencing severity or leniency can act as a learning experience for 
international research in this field. Erroneous conclusions on the causes of changes in prisoners 
rates can easily be drawn if due caution is not taken. The Dutch authors just quoted,  attributed 
changes in prisoners rates that were largely caused by changes in the level of serious crime to 
changes in sentencing. This misrepresentation can  be interpreted  as a product of the 
“fundamental attribution error” of  attributing problematic trends to “internal” factors such as 
sentencing tariffs rather than to “external” factors (trends in the size and nature of crime). The 
underlying motive for the error may well have been the wish to construe prisoners rates as 
essentially controllable by the political process. This interpretation should alert us to the possibility 
that other  criminological literature concluding that  trends in  prisoners rates are policy- rather 
than crime-driven may be based on a  similar bias.  
 
Comparative data on sentencing severity 
We have seen that sentencing tariffs of Dutch courts have been remarkably constant over time. 
With regard to the sentencing tariffs in The Netherlands, the question remains  how these 
invariable tariffs  compare to tariffs for similar crimes in other countries. The extensive 
comparative analyses of data on six categories of crime  conducted by an international research  
team supervised by Farrington, Langton and Tonry (2004)  does not fully meet the standard for 
proper poenametric research just discussed and falls far short of the proposed case based 
comparisons controlling for seriousness and recidivism. The analyses differentiate only between 
six fairly broad categories of crime at the aggregate level. Nevertheless, the results are 
informative. They suggest that inter country variation in sentencing tariffs is larger than within 
country variation over time. This result is in line with our conclusion that in The Netherlands 
variation over time has been remarkably limited. The results also provide some evidence that 
sentencing tariffs in The Netherland for robbery were between 1980 and 2000  comparatively 
mild, especially in comparison to the USA and Australia. The Dutch tariffs were more similar to 
those in Sweden.   
In my own work on global data on crime and justice, I have compared prisoners rates per 100,000 
in relation to national homicide rates around 2000 (Van Dijk, 2007). This analysis uses, in other 
words, homicide rates as a proxy control for the seriousness of the national crime situation. It 
showed that in a global comparison the Netherlands finds itself in the third quartile for prisoners 
rates (below average). In terms of homicide rates the country features in the fourth quartile (far 
below average). These result  define the country as one with moderate sentencing tariffs. From a 
global perspective homicide rates are low and prisoners rates are moderately low as well. The 
Dutch prisoners rates used were derived from the comprehensive data base maintained by King’s 
College in London (Walmsley, 2008). These rates are similar to the uncorrected rates from the 
Council of Europe. This means as explained above, that they are inflated. If adjusted rates has 
been used they would probably have confirmed that from a global perspective The Netherlands 
possesses a relatively mild penal climate9.  
                                                  
9  In the annual overview of statistics on crime and criminal justice in the Netherlands, issued in 2009 
Smit (2009) presents data on the ratio between the total of  convicted persons and numbers of 
prisoners. These results suggest that Dutch sentencing tariffs are relatively severe.  This result is 
inconclusive for two reasons. The seriousness of the cases tried by the courts is ignored and the  
analysis uses the inflated Dutch prisoners rates of the Council  of Europe (including illegal immigrants 
in administrative detention).  
A rough  index of punitiveness was constructed based on rates of prisoners in relation to rates of 
homicides. Countries with the lowest scores on this index are likely to impose comparatively 
severe sentencing tariffs. Singapore featured as one of the countries with the most severe 
sentencing tariffs according to this index (minus 87). The index was constructed with the aim to 
carry out correlational analyses, for example exploring a possible positive relationship between  
GDP per capita and sentencing severity. Such correlation was indeed in evidence. For 
explorative  purposes scores of individual countries can, in the absence of other indicators, be of 
interest as well. The Dutch score was  minus 22. This is far below the score of the USA of minus 
45. This indicates that Dutch tariffs are much milder than those in the USA. The Dutch score  is 
very similar to the score of the United Kingdom (minus 21) and Italy ( minus 16)  but higher  than 
the scores of, for example,  Germany (minus 12) and France (minus 1). Other Western European 
countries such as Sweden and Switzerland showed positive scores indicating comparatively even 
less severe sentencing. The Dutch score on this index of punitiveness situates the country 
somewhere in the high end of the range in terms of sentencing severity among Western 
European countries. As said, the Dutch prisoners rate was somewhat inflated. If corrected figures 
had been included in the analysis, the Dutch score would have been close to that of the 
Scandinavian countries.  
 
A third source of comparative information on punitiveness are  the results of public opinion polls. 
Findings from the Dutch Agency for Social and Cultural Research show that support for the 
treatment filosophy in criminal justice has decreased since the 1970s (Pakes, 2005). The 
International Crime Victims Surveys which have been carried out five times in a broad selection of 
develop and developing countries between 1989 and 2005, contain a question on the most 
appropriate punishment for a recidivist offender. Table 4 presents trend data on the percentages 
favouring imprisonment over community service or other milder forms of punishment.  
 
 Table 4 Percentage of the public opting for imprisonment as punishment for recidivist 
burglar in 2004/05 plus results from earlier surveys in countries  1989 – 2005 
ICVS. 
  1989 1992 1996 2000 
2004-
2005   
    
    
Japan  51 55  
Northern Ireland 45 49 54 53  
Istanbul (Turkey)  53  
England & Wales 38 37 49 51 51  
Bulgaria  50  
Scotland 39 48 52 49  
USA 53 56 56 47  
Canada 32 39 43 45 44  
New Zealand  26 40  
Ireland  38  
Poland  31 17 21 34  
Australia 36 34 . 37 33  
Sweden  26 22 31 33  
Netherlands 26 26 31 37 32  
Greece  30  
Norway 14 29  
Hungary  29  
Estonia  43 39 24 26  
Italy  22 24  
Germany 13 19  
Denmark  20 18  
Belgium 26 19 21 17  
Spain 27 17  
Iceland  16  
Luxembourg  16  
Portugal  26 15  
Finland 15 14 18 19 15  
Austria  10 13  
France 13 11 12 13  
Switzerland 9 9 12  
Average** 28 29 31 35 33   
 





Table 4 shows percentages of the public favoring imprisonment for a recidivist burglar per 
country. There was wide divergence across countries. Over 50% favored imprisonment in Japan, 
Northern Ireland and Istanbul. The population of France (13%) and Austria (13%) are least in 
favor of imprisonment. Anglo-Saxon countries tend to be among the most punitive (Van Kesteren, 
2009). The Netherland finds itself, once again, in the middle range. 
Leaving aside changes in relative levels of support for different sentencing options, the 2000 
ICVS sweep showed a hardening of attitudes towards punishment in some countries including 
England/Wales, Sweden and The Netherlands. This trend has not continued thereafter. In many 
countries support for imprisonment has remained stable. Lower percentages of the public favored 
imprisonment in 2005 than in 2000/1996 in the USA, Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland 
and Estonia.  
Public attitudes towards sentencing and actual prisoners rates are weakly correlated with each 
within Europe and, to a lesser extent, globally (Van Dijk, 2007; van Dijk, Van Kesteren & Smit, 
2008). In the USA and UK more people favor severe sentences than in other Western countries. 
The position of The Netherlands is unremarkable: moderately mild public attitudes go together 
with moderately low prisoners rates. If corrected prison figures had been used, The Dutch 
position would, once again, have been very similar to that of, for example, Sweden. 
 
High quality comparative studies on sentencing severity remain scarce. The overall impression 
regarding the sentencing severity in The Netherlands gained from the limited available 
comparative data is that at present the Dutch position is unremarkable. The available indicators 
suggest that in a European context both sentencing by the Dutch courts and public opinion is 
neither relatively mild nor relatively severe. In comparison to the USA and the United Kingdom, 
the penal climate in The Netherlands can still be qualified as relatively mild and similar to that of 
Sweden. 
 
The pillarized society and its heritage 
The results presented above allow a more precise and fact based appraisal of current and past 
prisoners rates in The Netherlands. The Dutch rates were comparatively mild around 1985, 
although this might partly have been a statistical artefact, caused by the exclusion of mentally 
disturbed offenders kept in clinics. Since 1990 Dutch prisoners rates have moved closer to the 
European mean in response to a steep rise in (serious) crime. This interim conclusion begs the 
new question why the level of crime has evidently increased more steeply in The Netherlands 
than in many other countries. A second conclusion is that falling crime rates have in The 
Netherlands led more rapidly and radically to falling prisoners rates, in spite of the emergence of 
somewhat more punitive attitudes among the public. Our analysis showed that the drop in 
prisoners rates has been facilitated by the retention of more or less fixed sentencing tariffs by the 
judiciary. Dutch courts seem to be less responsive to external pressures than courts elsewhere, 
eg those in the USA. This begs the question of the reasons for the relative imperturbableness of 
the Dutch courts. We will explore whether answers to these two questions can be found in the 
heritage of the pillarized society. 
 
In our view, the Netherlands has experienced a crime boom in the second part of the 20th century. 
Similar increases have occurred elsewhere. Probable causes of these booms are increasing 
opportunities of crime due to increased economic growth and modernization and decreasing 
levels of informal social control. During the past twenty years levels of crime in Western Europe 
were furthermore propelled by the failing social integration of new immigrant groups, most notably 
those of North African descent. A special criminogenic factor in the Netherlands might have been 
the relatively high degree of urbanization of Dutch society. However, other countries such as 
England/Wales have also become highly urbanized and face similar problems with the integration 
of immigrants. Explanations for the more pronounced crime boom in he Netherlands should in my 
opinion primarily be found in the sudden erosion of the institutions and cultural traditions 
belonging to the pillarized society between 1970 and 1990. In an official governmental report of 
1985 the rise of crime was attributed to “a decline since 1960 in the influence of many traditional  
social institutions within which the behaviour of individuals was effectively normalized, such as 
the family, clubs, and associations, the church, and the schools” (Society and Crime,1985). It 
could be said that this trend towards individualism was of course not restricted to the 
Netherlands. However, it seems plausible that in the 1950s and early 1960s pillarized youth 
organizations in the Netherlands were still able to employ mechanisms of informal social control  
more effectively than elsewhere.  In 1970 the majority of sports organizations were as mentioned 
still church-based.  Similar declines in the reach and social functions of the pillarized institutions 
can be given from other areas of social life (Becker, de Hart , 2006). Labour unions, child care 
organizations, housing estates  and probation offices have largely been depillarized. TV and radio 
broadcasting has to a large extent, though not fully,  been taken over by commercial companies. 
It would not be surprising if such transformations in the cultural and social spheres have created 
temporary deficiencies in the social regulation of behaviour. Around 1980 Dutch society was 
internationally known for its liberal attitudes towards the emerging youth culture characterized by 
the use of drugs and pre-marital sex. An unintended side effect of this permissiveness  might 
have been a comparatively stronger boom in volume crime, including in drugs-related criminality. 
For a recently depillarized society, traditionally relying on the mechanisms of informal social 
control of the pillarized organizations, the social integration of large groups of new immigrants 
from rural areas in urban settings with relatively few functioning institutions of their own, might 
have been especially challenging too10. 
As said, the launch of nationwide crime prevention programmes in the mid 1980s can be seen as 
an attempt to reintroduce or revitalize the institutions of informal social control of the pillarized 
society under the umbrella of welfare provisions.  Have crime prevention policies really been 
different in The Netherlands? In a recent review of the Dutch experiences with crime prevention 
over the past forty years, I concluded that crime prevention in The Netherlands, although  not as 
fully institutionalized as other vital state functions, seems better organized and better -funded 
than in most other Western countries (Van Dijk/De Waard, 2008).  In most other Western 
countries initiatives to promote crime prevention have been poorly funded and short-lived , partly 
because of affiliations with political parties on one side of the political spectrum (Crawford, 2009). 
Dutch crime prevention policies, supported by all main political parties, have proven to be more 
sustainable. They have also always been pragmatic and evidence-based rather than ideologically 
informed. Perhaps the most typical manifestation of Dutch crime prevention is the promotion of 
semi-formal surveillance in public transport and inner cities (Hesseling, 1995). In 1987 the 
Ministry of Justice entered into an effective partnership with the Protestant and “red” federations 
of social housing organization to introduce hundreds of “social caretakers” in high crime housing 
estates to enhance informal social control.  Such social measures were coupled with the 
introduction of national standards for situational crime prevention in different domains. In areas 
such as car security,  home security, security of businesses and of leisure centres these policies 
have been successful ( Wittebrood,  Van Beem,1994; Van Dijk & De Waard, 2008). Security 
standards  incorporated in national building codes have proven to have contributed to the drop in 
national burglary rates  (Vollaard, 2010). From the outset crime prevention in The Netherlands 
has focussed on both contextual factors and social factors pertaining to (potential) offenders. 
Situational crime prevention policies have been combined with innovative forms of offender-
oriented  prevention such as programmes for parental support and for diversionary sanctions for 
                                                  
10  A recurrent theme  in the debates on the social integration  of ethnic minorities in The Netherlands 
is the need of ethnic communities and their religious organizations to take up responsibility for the 
social control of their own deviant youth. A topical manifestation of traditional pillarized policies is the 
appointment of prominent representatives of ethnic communities in high positions such as a person of 
Turkish descent, Mrs  Albayrak as deputy minister of Justice responsible for immigration and one of 
Maroccan descent, Mr Aboutabi, as Mayor of Rotterdam (a town where ethnic tensions are the most 
serious).  
juvenile offenders ( so called HALT sanctions). Some of these programmes have shown 
disappointing results and have been discontinued or reformed. The commitment to invest in 
vulnerable individuals and families, however, has not waned. In recent years secondary and 
tertiary offender oriented prevention has been put in the hands of so called Security Houses, set 
up in all major cities. These houses are joint ventures of municipal agencies for child care and 
education, police and prosecutors. They are a new manifestation of the multi-agency approach 
typical of Dutch crime prevention policies. In 2009 the government announced considerable  
investments in a new programme of evidence -based  programmes for the re-insertion of (young) 
offenders. This expensive proposal was welcomed by the main political parties.  
 
Dutch preventive crime prevention measures are sometimes critiqued for containing repressive 
elements (Van Swaaningen,  Downes, 2007).  This point is well-taken from an international 
perspective. These policies are as said, pragmatically rather than ideologically inspired.  It seems 
plausible nevertheless that the continued  Dutch commitment for preventive approaches, missing 
in many other countries,  is rooted in the long established,  integrative traditions of the pillarized 
society and has contributed to a more humane criminal policy. 
Another lasting feature of Dutch crime prevention policies has been the collaboration between 
public agencies and the corporate world both at the central and local level. The National Platform 
for Crime Control brings together high ranking officials from the government with CEO’s of major 
Dutch companies and labour union leaders. The national platform, jointly chaired by the Minister 
of Justice and the president of the Dutch employers federation have effectively addressed many 
specific crime problems such as armed robbery, car and vehicle theft  and recreational violence. 
As discussed elsewhere, this collaborative spirit can be seen as an example of the Dutch Polder-
model, and, as such, as part of the cultural heritage of the politics of accommodation of the 
pillarized society of the past (Van Dijk/de Waard, 2008). The fall in levels of crime has been 
observed in several Western nations and is likely to have common causes such as improved 
policing and security. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the sustained and broad 
support for  evidence-based preventive approaches has contributed to the distinct fall in levels of 
crime in The Netherlands.  
Finally, a commentary on the relative autonomy of the Dutch judiciary. As discussed, the Dutch 
judiciary is a fully professional organization without any involvement of lay judges or jury 
members. All judges are appointed for life. Recruitment and promotion is in the hands of the 
Council of the Judiciary. For some types of cases the prosecutors follow national guidelines for 
their sentencing suggestions to the judges. The judges are, however, in no way bounded by 
these suggestions. In recent years there has been some criticism in the media of the “aloofness” 
of the judiciary, especially in discussions on a series of alleged judicial errors in high profile 
cases. The anti-Islam populist party of Mr Wilders has repeatedly expressed its disdain for the 
judiciary. This criticism may become more outspoken now that Mr Wilders himself prosecuted for 
stirring up xenophobia and racism and may be convicted. In spite of these criticisms there is 
evidence from public opinion research that the majority of the Dutch public as well as of the Dutch 
business community maintains a high level of confidence in the integrity and professionalism of 
the judiciary (Rechtstreeks, 2004; Dekker & Van der Meer, 2007)11. Proposals to introduce jury 
trials have in 2009 been summarily dismissed by government and Parliament. The independent, 
professional  judiciary is still widely regarded as a pillar of Dutch society. 
 
In conclusion 
At the present juncture criminal policies in The Netherlands seem relatively stable and 
uncontested. In the general elections for Parliament in 2010 crime and security has not been an 
issue. Thanks partly to sustained investments in preventive policies,  property crime has 
significantly decreased. The once controversial health- based policies regarding drug addicts ( 
needle exchange programmes and methadone and heroin maintenance programmes)  find favour 
with experts both nationally and across the world and will, with some amendments, probably be 
                                                  
11  See also the annual reports of the World Economic Forum based on the business executives 
surveys which consistently rank the Dutch courts as the most highly rated in the world in terms of 
independence and reliability. 
retained12.  The independent position of the judiciary is not uncontested but radical changes in 
their legal status seem for the moment unlikely. For these reasons, prisoners rates have been 
falling considerably in recent years and are bound to continue falling in the near future. 
In my personal reading our findings suggest that most of the institutions  of the pillarized society 
may have disappeared but that some its inclusive traditions still remain. Dutch society has 
certainly not moved towards the unconditional adoption of USA- style, repressive criminal 
policies. The country seems still committed to professional and pragmatic rather than populist 
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